[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":83},["ShallowReactive",2],{"event-page-will-russia-capture-havrylivka-by-february-28":3},{"event":4,"related":40},{"id":5,"slug":6,"title":7,"description":8,"summary":9,"category":10,"subcategory":11,"tags":12,"image":16,"probability":17,"volume24hr":18,"volume1wk":19,"liquidity":20,"openInterest":21,"trendScore":22,"active":23,"closed":24,"featured":24,"startDate":25,"endDate":26,"createdAtRemote":27,"updatedAtRemote":28,"affiliateUrl":29,"polymarketUrl":29,"searchKeywords":30,"syncedAt":38,"createdAt":39,"marketCount":17},"191885","will-russia-capture-havrylivka-by-february-28","Will Russia capture Havrylivka by...?","This market will resolve to “Yes” if, according to the ISW map, Russia captures the intersection at 48.0728° N, 36.5235° E in Havrylivka by the listed date, 11:59 PM ET.\n\nThe intersection will be considered captured if any part of the intersection is shaded red on the ISW map (https:\u002F\u002Fstorymaps.arcgis.com\u002Fstories\u002F36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375) by the resolution date. If the area is not shaded red by the specified date, the market will resolve to “No”.\n\nFor any change on the ISW map to qualify for this market’s resolution, the relevant shading indicating Russian control must persist through the next full ISW daily update cycle. If ISW skips a day, shading must persist until the next finalized ISW update is published, regardless of the date. Any continuous shading which reflects either “Assessed Russian Control”, “Assessed Russian Advance In Ukraine”, or “Assessed Russian Gains in the Past 24 Hours” will qualify. “Assessed Russian Infiltration Areas in Ukraine” will not qualify.\n\nIf Russia comes into control of this territory as a result of a negotiated settlement, this will qualify for a 'Yes' resolution, regardless of whether it is shaded red in the ISW map. An announcement of a negotiated settlement that gives Russia de jure control will not qualify. Actual control must be established.\n\nOnce Russia captures the intersection, any subsequent loss of control will not be considered towards the resolution of this market.\n\nIntersection Location: https:\u002F\u002Fpolymarket-upload.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com\u002FHavrylivka+1.png\n\nIntersection Location in Havrylivka: https:\u002F\u002Fpolymarket-upload.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com\u002FHavrylivka+2.png\n\nHavrylivka Location: https:\u002F\u002Fpolymarket-upload.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com\u002FHavrylivka+3.png\n\nLocation on Google Maps: https:\u002F\u002Fmaps.app.goo.gl\u002FbpdGhKirAxb1ZT3k9\n\nThe primary resolution source for this market will be the ISW Ukraine map. If the ISW map is rendered unavailable, information from DeepStateMap (https:\u002F\u002Fdeepstatemap.live\u002F) may be used. If information from both the ISW and DeepStateMap are rendered permanently unavailable, a consensus of credible reporting may be used.\n\nNote: Any temporary glitches or errors in the map will not be considered.","Will Russia capture Havrylivka by...? is a geopolitics prediction market focused on whether Russian forces will capture the specified intersection in Havrylivka, Ukraine, by the resolution deadline at 11:59 PM ET on February 28. The market resolves using the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) map, with DeepStateMap or credible reporting used only if the primary sources are unavailable. To count as a “Yes,” the intersection must be shaded red on the ISW map in a way that indicates Russian control and persists through the next full update cycle; a negotiated settlement that establishes actual Russian control would also qualify. Temporary map glitches do not count, and the intersection location is defined precisely in the market rules.\n\nThis event matters because it tracks battlefield developments in the Ukraine war and the market sentiment around territorial control in a specific location. As a prediction market, it reflects traders’ event prediction and odds rather than a certainty. The current probability is 0%, suggesting the market is not pricing in a Russian capture before the deadline. Tags such as Ukraine, Geopolitics, Politics, and Ukraine Map reinforce the event’s focus on military and territorial forecasting.","GEOPOLITICS","Politics",[11,13,14,15],"Ukraine","Geopolitics","Ukraine Map","https:\u002F\u002Fpolymarket-upload.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com\u002Fwill-russia-capture-havrylivka-by-february-28-6J-0wysd6LJz.jpg",0,10.869564,54114.737307,3422.73146,811.572027,16924.4022661,true,false,"2026-01-29T03:43:16.193Z","2026-05-31T00:00:00.000Z","2026-01-28T19:29:01.425Z","2026-05-30T10:33:02.868Z","https:\u002F\u002Fpolymarket.com\u002Fevent\u002Fwill-russia-capture-havrylivka-by-february-28?r=predstack",[31,32,33,34,35,36,37],"will russia capture havrylivka by...?","will russia capture havrylivka by...? prediction","will russia capture havrylivka by...? odds","will russia capture havrylivka by...? probability","geopolitics prediction market","geopolitical forecast","geopolitical probability","2026-06-05T13:20:23.302Z","2026-05-30T10:43:02.041Z",[41,54,67],{"id":42,"title":43,"slug":44,"category":10,"subcategory":11,"tags":45,"probability":17,"createdAt":49,"updatedAt":50,"resolutionDate":51,"description":52,"summary":52,"volume1wk":53,"featured":23},"517606","US announces new Iran agreement\u002Fceasefire extension by...?","us-announces-new-iran-agreementceasefire-extension-by",[11,14,46,47,48],"Iran Ceasefire","Iran","U.S. x Iran","2026-05-30T10:42:44.017Z","2026-05-30T10:38:09.490Z",null,"This market will resolve to “Yes” if the U.S. officially announces an extension of the ceasefire agreement between the U.S. and Iran, defined as a publicly announced commitment to the continued halt of direct military engagement with Iran or announces a new peace agreement, ceasefire framework, or diplomatic agreement under which the ceasefire will continue by the specified date 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to \"No\".\n\nIf a qualifying announcement is officially made before the resolution date, this market will resolve to “Yes,” regardless of whether the ceasefire extension ultimately takes effect.\n\nA qualifying announcement requires clear public confirmation from the U.S. government that the U.S. has either:\n\n1. Extended its commitment to the ceasefire, either as a dated\u002Ftime-based extension (e.g. a 60 day extension) or through an explicit statement that the ceasefire has been extended.\n\n2. Renewed the existing ceasefire as part of a broader peace agreement, ceasefire framework, or diplomatic agreement under which the ceasefire will continue.\n\nStatements which merely acknowledge, reaffirm, or describe the current ceasefire as remaining in effect, or which outline further negotiations or de-escalation measures, without announcing a new extension period, or successor agreement under which the ceasefire will continue, will not qualify.\n\nThe following would qualify:\n- President Trump announcing that “the ceasefire has been extended for another 60 days.”\n- An official U.S. statement announcing that “the United States and Iran have agreed to extend the ceasefire framework while negotiations continue.”\n- President Trump’s April 21, 2026 announcement extending the ceasefire “until the Iranian negotiators could reach a unified proposal.”\n- An announcement that the US and Iran have agreed to a new temporary framework under which the ceasefire would continue as Iran gradually reopens the Strait of Hormuz and the United States begins to unfreeze Iranian assets would qualify.\n\nThe following would not qualify:\n- Statements that the ceasefire merely “remains in effect” or “continues to hold,” without announcing a new extension, renewal, or successor agreement.\n- Statements that “the ceasefire will remain in effect while negotiations continue,” without announcing that the ceasefire itself has been extended, or a new framework or deal has been reached\n- Statements that negotiations are progressing, that talks are ongoing, or that the parties are “getting closer” to a deal, without announcing that the ceasefire itself has been extended, renewed, or continued under a new agreement.\n\n\nAn overwhelming consensus of credible reporting that a qualifying extension or successor agreement has been definitively established will also suffice for a “Yes” resolution.\n\nThis market’s resolution will be based on official statements from the U.S. government and will not require confirmation from Iran. ",8902186.761979992,{"id":55,"title":56,"slug":57,"category":10,"subcategory":11,"tags":58,"probability":61,"createdAt":62,"updatedAt":63,"resolutionDate":64,"description":65,"summary":65,"volume1wk":66,"featured":24},"105695","Will the US officially declare war on Venezuela by...?","will-the-us-officially-declare-war-on-venezuela-in-2025",[11,59,60,14],"Venezuela","Trump",1.5,"2026-05-30T10:42:44.969Z","2026-05-30T10:31:37.597Z","2026-06-30T00:00:00.000Z","This market will resolve to \"Yes\" if the United States formally declares war on Venezuela through an act of Congress between December 15 and December 31, 2025, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to \"No.\"\n\nTo qualify, Congress must pass a formal declaration of war, consistent with its constitutional authority under Article I, Section 8. Authorizations for the use of military force (AUMFs), executive orders, presidential statements, or military actions do not qualify unless accompanied by a formal declaration of war enacted by Congress and signed into law.\n\nThe resolution source will be a clear consensus of credible reporting.",2888668.4569809996,{"id":68,"title":69,"slug":70,"category":10,"subcategory":11,"tags":71,"probability":17,"createdAt":78,"updatedAt":79,"resolutionDate":80,"description":81,"summary":81,"volume1wk":82,"featured":24},"57088","Israel x Hamas Ceasefire Phase II by...?","israel-x-hamas-ceasefire-phase-ii-by-october-31",[11,72,14,73,74,75,60,76,77],"Gaza","Israel","Middle East","World","Trump Presidency","Trump-Netanyahu","2026-05-30T10:42:49.105Z","2026-05-30T10:31:30.339Z","2025-12-31T00:00:00.000Z","On October 8, an agreement on an initial ceasefire (Phase 1) was announced, constituting a halt in fighting, a partial Israeli pullback to a “yellow line,” prisoner swaps, expanded aid, and the release of hostages. A second phase of the deal, yet to be negotiated, is expected to address further Israeli withdrawal, Hamas’s disarmament, and the establishment of new security and governance arrangements in Gaza.\n\nThis market will resolve to \"Yes\" if an official agreement for the second phase of the Israel–Hamas ceasefire, defined as a publicly announced mutual agreement, is reached between Israel and Hamas by October 31, 2025, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.\n\nIf the agreement is officially reached before the resolution date, this market will resolve to \"Yes,\" regardless of if\u002Fwhen the agreement goes into effect.\n\nFor purposes of this market, a “second phase” ceasefire agreement refers to a deal publicly acknowledged by both Israel and Hamas (directly or via recognized mediators such as the U.S., Egypt, or Qatar) that goes beyond the Phase 1 initial truce and includes commitments towards a comprehensive or “full” ceasefire.  Any agreement that is publicly described by the parties, or by mediators on their behalf, as the completion of “Phase 2” of the ceasefire will qualify, regardless of whether it includes further Israeli withdrawals beyond the “yellow line,” or agreements by Hamas to disarm.\n\nAn extension or continuation of the Phase 1 arrangement alone will not qualify.\n\nThis market's resolution will be based on official announcements from both Israel and Hamas, however a wide consensus of credible media reporting will also qualify.",482521.06745700014,1780676661793]